In this paper, we propose a novel authenticated key exchange scheme based on the Bi-GISIS problem for the post-quantum world. The security of the proposed scheme is based on the hardness assumption of the Bi-GISIS problem. The reusable key property is provided for the proposed scheme in the random oracle model by using the bilateral pasteurization method. To obtain an authenticated key exchange scheme, we use the implicit authentication steps. The security analysis of the proposed scheme is presented in the Bellare-Rogaway security model, where weak perfect forward secrecy is provided. We also give novel perspective to the Bi-GISIS based authenticated key exchange problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
Authenticated key exchange (AKE) schemes aim to obtain a shared secret key by including authentication steps in the communication between two parties in the insecure channel. Authentication steps allow these schemes to become resistant to various attacks such as man-in-the-middle [1] . The security of cryptosystems is based on computationally difficult problems. Such as the integer factorization problem and the discrete logarithm problem. That cannot be solved in polynomial time by using traditional computers. However, an algorithm, proposed by Shor in 1994 [2] , solved these problems in polynomial time in a quantum computer. As a result of this algorithm, traditional AKE schemes are insecure in the postquantum world. Lattice-based cryptosystem family is one of the fundamental systems that are believed to be safe in the post-quantum. The security of these systems is based on hard lattice problems that are difficult to solve in polynomial time for both current and post-quantum computing systems. The main hard lattice problems are shortest vector problem (SVP), closest vector problem (CVP), short integer solution (SIS), inhomogeneous short integer solution (ISIS), learning with errors (LWE), and ring variant of learning with errors (RLWE) [3] . There are also alternative hard lattice problems proposed by reducing the hardness of these main problems. For example, the bilateral generalization inhomogeneous The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Derek Abbott . short integer solution (Bi-GISIS) problem was described in [4] .
Basic information security concepts such as confidentiality and authentication, are guaranteed by AKE schemes. To provide confidentiality, the session key is prevented from being obtained by adversaries, while authentication is provided by preventing adversaries from imitating the communication [5] . There are two different ways of authentication for key exchange (KE) schemes: implicit and explicit [6] . In explicit authentication, signature schemes and message authentication codes (MAC) are used. However, in the implicit authentication there is no need to use additional structures such as those in the explicit authentication. Instead, ephemeralstatic public/private keys and hash functions are used. While static key values are needed to achieve the weak perfect forward secrecy (wPFS), ephemeral keys and hash functions are used to provide authentication [7] . There are several studies to construct quantum resistant AKE schemes with explicit authentication in [3] , [8] , and implicit authentication in [7] , [9] .
A. MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTION
The security of the AKE scheme given in [7] is based on the hardness assumption of the RLWE problem. Unlike other proposed AKE schemes, the proposed scheme contains reusable key property in the random oracle model (ROM). This property is provided by the bilateral pasteurization method and then the same key can be used in several executions of the AKE scheme. Moreover, adapting reusable key property to different key exchange schemes is needed for the post-quantum world.
In this paper, we modify the KE scheme described in [4] to provide a novel solution the open problem given in [4] . The security of the proposed scheme is based on the hardness assumption of the Bi-GISIS problem whose security can be reduced to the module variant of learning with errors (MLWE) problem. In the modified scheme, we use the bilateral pasteurization method to achieve the reusable key property. With the modified scheme, the same key is guaranteed to be reused in multiple executions. Our main aim is to construct an authenticated version of a KE scheme given in [4] . We prefer to use implicit authentication steps to achieve this. We also explain the security analysis of the proposed scheme in the ROM under the Bellare-Rogaway (BR) security model, which provides wPFS.
B. ORGANIZATION
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we provide mathematical background. In Section III, we explain the proposed scheme step-by-step and then give the correctness of the proposed Bi-GISIS based AKE scheme. Then, we present a detailed security analysis of the AKE scheme under the BR model. In Section IV, we compare the proposed scheme with the previous ones. Conclusion of this paper is given in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we give mathematical background to construct an AKE with reusable keys.
Bilateral generalization inhomogenous short integer solution problem is recalled in Definition 1.
Definition 1 (Bi-GISIS [4] ): Let A ∈ m×m q be a random matrix with rank m. Given x 1 , x T 2 such that
, the aim is to find the secret vectors s 1 , s T 2 . In Definition 2, the decisional variant of bilateral generalization inhomogenous short integer solution problem (DBi-GISIS) is given.
Definition 2 (DBi-GISIS [4] ): The aim is to decide the distribution of K = {A, x 1 , x T 2 }. There are two cases: K is sampled either
. In Definition 3, neg function is provided. It's needed in the assumption of the DBi-GISIS problem and the security analysis of the proposed scheme.
Definition 3 (Neg Function [4] ): neg: N → R function can be defined as for every c > 0 if there exists an n 0 ∈ N such that neg (n) < 1 n c for every n > n 0 , then neg is a negligible function.
The hardness assumption of the DBi-GISIS is detailed in Definition 4.
Definition 4 (DBi-GISIS Assumption [4] ): Let A ∈ m×m q be a random matrix, {A,
. Then, any probabilistic polynomial algorithm (PPA) satisfies
The hardness assumption of the DBi-GISIS problem is explained with Lemma 1. The idea is the same used in [4] (in Lemma 18).
Lemma 1: Let the DBi-GISIS assumption be satisfied,
. Then, there exists no PPA distinguishing between K 1 and K 2 with non-negligible advantage.
The equivalent hard problem to the DBi-GISIS is given in Lemma 2. The idea is the same used in [4] (in Lemma 19).
Lemma 2: Assume that the decisional module variant of learning with errors (M-DLWE) [10] is computationally hard problem. Then, the assumption DBi-GISIS, which is equivalent to M-DLWE, is satisfied.
By combining Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, Corollary 1 defines the hardness assumption of the Bi-GISIS problem.
Corollary 1: As long as the hardness assumption of the DBi-GISIS is satisfied, the security of the Bi-GISIS problem relies on the hardness assumption DBi-GISIS, which is equivalent the M-DLWE problem.
In Definition 5, MSB reconciliation function that is used to reconcile errors in the proposed AKE scheme is given.
Definition 5 (MSB Reconciliation Function [4] ): Given u ∈ Z q , then
The main aim is to generate the same shared secret key in the proposed AKE scheme. To achieve this, the most significant bit (r) of the coefficient is selected.
Remark 1: MSB reconciliation function is defined for u ∈ Z q . However, in the proposed AKE, we use x ∈ m q . MSB function outputs each coefficient, i.e., x i ∈ Z n q for i ∈ [m] is computed seperately.
The reusable key idea is given in Definition 6. Definition 6 (Reusable Key [7] ): Assume that the same keys are generated/used in the several executions of the scheme. If an adversary (ADV) cannot obtain any information about the secret keys by using previous ones, then the scheme has reusable key property.
The pasteurization method is used to ensure that the reusable key property is achieved in KE protocols [7] . By using this method, the probability of distinguishing the difference between RLWE samples and uniformly random values is negligible in the presence of an adversary [11] . The core idea of the proposed method is that if an ADV controls the protocol, he/she cannot obtain any information about the secret key. If for any PPT adversary the advantage is negligible, then the proposed scheme is called secure under this [12] .
In Definition 7, the modified or namely bilateral pasteurization method is explained to provide reusable key property for the Bi-GISIS based schemes.
Definition 7 (Bilateral Pasteurization Method -Bi-P): Let A ∈ m×m q be a random matrix, {x 1 , x T 2 } be sampled from the Bi-GISIS distribution described in Definition 1, H 1 be a cryptographic hash function and g 2 , g T 1 ← r D m ,σ . Then, the bilateral pasteurization is defined as
(1) As a result of being non-commutativity of matrix multiplication, the terms AH 1 (x 1 ) and H 1 (x 2 ) T A are different from each other. This method yields two cases.
The main idea of the Bi-P method is that nobody can obtain any information about the secret keys by using { ← →
} / ∈ Bi-GISIS is statistically close to uniformly distribution. To provide this, we propose the extended versions of Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 given in [13] .
Lemma 3: Let x ← r θ , y ← r ϑ. Then, p = x + y is statistically close to the uniform distribution:
1 q mn Lemma 4: Let q be a prime number, A ∈ m×m q be a uniformly random matrix, and p ∈ m q . Given (A, b 1 = As
, then the multiplication of the probabilities of b 1 and b T 2 :
By combining Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, we explain the probability of the Bi-GISIS distribution in Corollary 2. , which is statistically close to uniform distribution over m q , is obtained. The distribution of the Bi-P method is given in Corollary 3. It's obtained by combining Lemma 3, Corollary 2 and Definition 7.
Corollary 3: Let H 1 be a ROM that the output of H 1 is sampled from D m ,σ , x 1 , x T 2 ← r θ and e 1 , e T 2 ← r D m ,σ . Then, the components of the Bi-P method ← →
are statistically close to uniform distribution in the ROM.
By using Corollary 3, we conclude that if ADV controls a party in the scheme, he/she shouldn't obtain any information about the secret keys. Due to the hardness assumption of the Bi-GISIS problem, an adversary cannot distinguish between a statistically uniform distribution and the Bi-GISIS distribution.
In Definition 8, fresh session is recalled. Definition 8 (Fresh Session [8] ): Let sid be a session matching sid. The sid, an accomplished session, is called fresh, either sessionKR(sid) and sessionKR( sid) shouldn't query or if sid doesn't exist, then staticKR(A) and staticKR(B) shouldn't query.
III. BI-GISIS BASED AUTHENTICATED KEY EXCHANGE SCHEME WITH REUSABLE KEY
In this section, we explain the Bi-GISIS based AKE scheme with reusable key in the ROM and give the correctness of the proposed scheme. Then, we provide a detailed security analysis in the Bellare-Rogaway (BR) [14] security model.
To construct a novel AKE scheme, we modify the KE scheme given in [4] . By using the Bi-P approach given in Definition 7, we provide reusable keys for the modified scheme. The security of our scheme is just based on the hardness assumption of the Bi-GISIS problem. The proposed scheme uses hash functions, static keys and ephemeral keys to provide the implicit authentication. In Figure 1 , the proposed AKE scheme with reusable keys is summarized. In the proposed scheme, the first step of the implicit authentication is the usage of static/ephemeral private and public key pairs. Static public and private key pairs, generated once in each execution of the proposed scheme, contain authentication information about the parties. Ephemeral public and private key pairs, which are reconstructed each execution of the proposed scheme, used in exchange information between the parties. The second step of the implicit authentication is provided by the hash functions H 1 and H 2 . The reusable key property of the proposed scheme is ensured by the Bi-P method. To obtain the same shared secret key, the MSB reconciliation function is used. Briefly, the same authenticated shared secret key (sk 1 = sk 2 ) is obtained by using all of these components, which are described in Figure 1 .
The correctness of the proposed AKE scheme is given in Section III-A.
A. CORRECTNESS
We give the correctness of the proposed scheme in Equation (2) .
give the same property because of the hash function H 1 . We use the idea detailed in [4] for the computation of shared secret keys. In other words, for i ∈ [m] e 2,i < √ nσ = β and r i < √ nσ = β, then, we have the following:
⇒ ||e T 2 r|| ≈ mnβ 2 By combining Remark 2, Definition 5, and Equation (2) then,
In conclusion, if k 1 − k 2 ≤ 16mnβ 2 + 2β, then the probability of having the same shared secret key is at most O(n2 −λ ) in the proposed AKE scheme.
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We provide the security analysis in the BR model with wPFS in the ROM. To present the security analysis of proposed scheme, we construct a hybrid BR model based on [7] - [9] . This model aims to show that it provides wPFS in the ROM. With the reusable key property ensured by the Bi-P approach, any adversary cannot obtain any information about the static secret keys in each execution of the proposed AKE scheme. In the two-pass AKE schemes, if a passive adversary controls the communication, then previous session keys are protected with wPFS. To provide wPFS in the proposed AKE scheme, we present the security proofs and examine possible cases for the session key received from the test session in the BR security model.
• The owner of the test session sid = (II, 1, A*, B*, x * 1 , x T * 2 ) is the initiator (1).
-TYPE ADV 1 : For sid, x T * 2 is generated with the answer(II, 2, B*, A*, x * 1 ) query. -TYPE ADV 2 : For sid, x T * 2 isn't generated with the answer(II, 2, B*, A*, x * 1 ) query. • The owner of the test session sid = (II, 2, B*, A*, x * 1 , x T * 2 ) is the responder (2).
-TYPE ADV 3 : For sid, x * 1 isn't generated with start(II, 1, A*, B*) query.
-TYPE ADV 4 : For sid, x * 1 is generated with the start(II, 1, A*, B*) query. In addition, A* either completes the session by using x T * 2 or cannot. -TYPE ADV 5 : For sid, x * 1 is generated with the start(II, 1, A*, B*) query. In addition, A* completes the session by using another x T 2 such that x T 2 = x T * 2 . In Figure 2 , the main components of the security model for the proposed AKE scheme is presented.
Theorem 1 provides the main structure of the security proof.
Theorem 1: Let n, λ = O(n), m ≥ 2 be the latticedimension, the security parameter, and the constant, respectively. Let
+2β. Then, the hardness assumption of the Bi-GISIS, given in Corollary 1, is satisfied. Moreover, the proposed AKE scheme with reusable key property is secure in the BR security model in the ROM. The detailed proof of Theorem 1 will be explained in Section III-B1 and Section III-B2.
1) THE OWNER OF TEST SESSION SID IS THE INITIATOR
We start with the initiator. Let the owner of sid * = (II, 1, A*, B*, x * 1 , x T * 2 ) be the initiator.
a: TYPE ADV 1
In this type, by considering the fresh session definition (Definition 8), an adversary ADV should provide the following information for wPFS:
• ADV can obtain the static secret key values of both parties by using the staticKR query.
• ADV can monitor the communication between the parties. Lemma 5 presents the security proof of ADV 1 .
Lemma 5: Let ADV be an adversary of type ADV 1 . The hardness assumption of the Bi-GISIS is satisfied with the parameters λ = O(n),
Then, the advantage of ADV is negligible in the ROM.
Proof: The proof of Lemma 5 is discussed by considering all choices called Game 1,i , where i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 5}.
Game 1,0 :
• Simulator (S) chooses A ← r m×m q . By using A, static public keys are honestly generated.
• S expects that ADV chooses sid * = (II, 1, A*, B*, x * 1 , x T * 2 ) as a test session. For this session: 
1 is generated from the s * 1 -th session of A* with the start(II, 1, A*, B*) query. x T * 2 is generated from the s T * 2 -th session of B* with the answer(II, 2, B*, A*, x * 1 ) query.
• S works with ADV and impersonates the oracle in the following way: · If ℘ = 0, then the output of S is shared with random secret key sk 1 ← r {0, 1} λ . · Otherwise, the output of S is sk 1 , which is the real session key of sid. The Analysis of Game 1,0 : The probability that S can cancel the execution in Game 1,0 is 1 t 2 N 2 . Proof: S randomly chooses A*,B*, s * 1 , s T * 2 as follows. Let A*, B*← r {P 1 , . . . , P N }. A* and B* are randomly selected from N elements. The right session part is one of N possible elements.
. . , t}. s * 1 and s T * 2 are randomly selected from t elements. The right party is one of t possible elements. All of these choices are independent events for ADV. Therefore, the probability of canceling the execution is computed as 1 N · 1 N · 1 t · 1 t . Game 1,1 : The oracles described in Game 1,0 are impersonated by S, except for the complete. Proof: There is only one operation (sk 1 = sk 2 ) in Game 1,1 . Since this operation does not affect the integrity of the scheme, there is no difference between Game 1,0 and Game 1,1 in terms of parameters and queries.
Game 1,2 : The oracles described in Game 1,1 are impersonated by S, except for the start. 2) The session is the s * 1 -th session of A. The Analysis of Game 1,2 : As long as the hardness assumption of the Bi-GISIS is satisfied, then the probability of distinguishing the difference between Game 1,1 and Game 1,2 is negligible for all ADVs.
Proof: According to the hardness assumption of the DBi-GISIS problem, there is no polynomial time algorithm except for negligible probability that distinguishes between (A, x 1 = Ar 1 +f 1 , x T 2 ) sampled in the Bi-GISIS and (A, x 1 ← r m q , x T 2 ) sampled uniformly at random. Under the hardness assumption of the Bi-GISIS, we conclude that Game 1,2 is computationally indistinguishable from Game 1,1 except for negligible probability. Game 1,3 : The oracles described in Game 1,1 are impersonated by S, except for the complete. 2) The session is the s * 1 -th session of A. 3) x T 2 isn't generated by the session of s T * 2 -th of B. The Analysis of Game 1,3 : As long as the hardness assumption of the Bi-GISIS is satisfied, then the probability of distinguishing the difference between Game 1,2 and Game 1,3 is negligible for all ADVs.
Proof: In this game, since x T 2 isn't generated with the answer query by the session s T 2 -th of B, there is no information about the distribution of x T 2 . However, in the Bi-P approach the distribution of ← → x 2 T obtained independently from x T 2 is known. This distribution, which is given in Corollary 3, is statistically close to uniform distribution. By rewriting the key material of A, we obtain Equation (4).
As long as (s 1 + r 1 + c) and h 1 are sampled from D m ,σ and ← → x 2 T is uniform in m q , then ← → x 2 T (s 1 + r 1 + c) + h 1 cannot be distinguished from uniformly random sample in m q due to the hardness assumption of the Bi-GISIS. Therefore, Game 1,2 , in which k 1 is generated by using the Bi-GISIS sample, is computationally indistinguishable from Game 1,3 , in which k 1 is generated by using random sample, except for negligible probability. Game 1,4 : S chooses w 1 ← r m q and computes k 1 = w 1 + p T 2 (r 1 + c). The Analysis of Game 1,4 : As long as the hardness assumption of the Bi-GISIS is satisfied, then the probability of distinguishing the difference between Game 1,2 and Game 1,4 is negligible for all ADVs.
By using the same idea given in the analysis of Game 1,2 , as long as w 1 ← r m q , then k 1 is uniformly at random over m q . Thus, Game 1,4 is computationally indistinguishable from Game 1,2 except for negligible probability.
Game 1,5 : The oracles described in Game 1,3 are impersonated by S, except for the answer.
• When the answer(II, 2, B, A, x 1 ) is queried over S, x T 2 , k 2 ← r m q are randomly selected and x T 2 is sent to the other party by S, when the following conditions are completely satisfied. 1) (A, B) = (A*, B*).
2) The session is the s T * 2 -th session of B*. 3) x 1 is generated by the session of s * 1 -th of A*. -Otherwise, S impersonated the answer given in Game 1,3 . The Analysis of Game 1,5 : As long as the hardness assumption of the Bi-GISIS is satisfied, then the probability of distinguishing the difference between Game 1,3 and Game 1,5 is negligible for all ADVs.
Proof:
By using the same proof idea given in the analysis of Game 1,3 , we conclude that the probability of distinguishing the difference between Game 1,3 and Game 1,5 is negligible.
b: TYPE ADV 2
In this type, the test session doesn't have a matching session. Therefore, wPFS is not provided for ADV 2 . Lemma 6 presents the security proof of ADV 2 .
Lemma 6: Let ADV be an adversary whose type is ADV 2 . The hardness assumption of the Bi-GISIS is satisfied with the parameters λ = O(n), √ nσ = β, q = O(2 λ mnβ 2 ), and k 1 − k 2 ≤ 16mnβ 2 + 2β. Then, the advantage of ADV is negligible in the ROM.
Proof: The proof of Lemma 6 is explained with for all Game 2,i , where i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 4}. Game 2,0 :
• S chooses A ← r m×m q . By using A, static public keys are honestly generated.
• S expects that ADV chooses sid * = (II, 1, A*, B*, x * 1 , x T * 2 ) as a test session. For this session:
1 is generated from the s * 1 -th session of A* with the start(II, 1, A*, B*) query. · If ℘ = 0, then the output of S is shared with random secret key sk 1 ← r {0, 1} λ . · Otherwise, the output of S is sk 1 , which is the real session key of sid. The Analysis of Game 2,0 : The probability that S can cancel the execution in Game 2,0 is 1 tN 2 . Proof: In this game, S randomly chooses A*,B*, s * 1 . By using the same idea given in the analysis of Game 1,0 , we conclude that the probability of cancelling the execution is computed as 1 N · 1 N · 1 t . Game 2,1 : The oracles described in Game 2,0 are impersonated by S, except for the answer.
• When the answer(II, 2, B, A, x 1 ) is queried over S,
is computed by S, when the following conditions are completely satisfied. 1) B = B*.
2) The session is the s * 2 -th session of B*. -Otherwise, S impersonates the oracle the answer given in Game 3,1 , which is described in Section III-B2. The Analysis of Game 2,1 : The probability of distinguishing the difference between Game 2,0 and Game 2,1 is negligible for all ADVs.
Proof: In this game, S knows all the static secret keys (s 1 , s T 2 ). The correctness of scheme is ensured in S with
which we obtained by rewriting k 2 . Then, Game 2,0 , where k 2 is generated by using s T 2 , is computationally indistinguishable from Game 2,1 , where k 2 is generated by using s T 1 , except for negligible probability. Game 2,2 : The oracles described in Game 2,1 are imitated by S, except for the start and the complete.
• When the complete(II, 1, A, B, x 1 , x T 2 ) is queried over S, k 1 = ← → x 2 T (s 2 +r 1 +c)+p T 2 (r 1 +c)+h 1 is computed by S, when the following conditions are completely satisfied. 1) A = B*.
2) The session is the s * 2 -th session of B*. -Otherwise, S impersonates the oracle complete given in Game 2,1 . The Analysis of Game 2,2 : The probability of distinguishing the difference between Game 2,1 and Game 2,2 is negligible for all ADVs.
Proof: In this game, S knows all the static secret keys (s 1 , s T 2 ). By using the same idea given in the analysis of Game 2,1 , we conclude that Game 2,2 , in which k 1 is generated by using s 2 , is computationally indistinguishable from Game 2,1 , in which k 1 is generated by using s 1 , except for negligible probability. Game 2,3 : S impersonates the oracles given in Game 2,2 except for the query to replace the static secret key of B*, which is p T * 2 , with the uniformly random sample, which is u T 2 ← r m q . The Analysis of Game 2,3 : As long as the hardness assumption of the Bi-GISIS is satisfied, then the probability of distinguishing the difference between Game 2,2 and Game 2,3 is negligible for all ADVs.
Proof: As long as the hardness assumption of the Bi-GISIS is satisfied, p T * 2 shouldn't be distinguished from u T 2 ← r m q . There doesn't exist any polynomial time algorithm that distinguishes between Game 2,2 , where p T * 2 is an example of Bi-GISIS, and Game 2,3 , where p T * 2 is uniformly random sample. Game 2,4 : The oracles described in Game 2,3 are impersonated by S, except for the complete.
• When the complete (II, 2, B, A, x 1 ) is queried over S, k 1 ← r m q is selected by S, when the following conditions are completely satisfied. 1) (A, B) = (A*, B*).
2) The session is the s * 1 -th session of A*. 3) x T * 2 isn't generated by using the answer(II, 2, B*, A*, x 1 ). -Otherwise, S impersonates the oracle complete given in Game 2,3 . The Analysis of Game 2,4 : As long as the hardness assumption of the Bi-GISIS is satisfied, then the probability of distinguishing the difference between Game 2,3 and Game 2,4 is negligible for all ADVs.
Proof: In the calculation of k 1 = ← → x 2 T (s 2 + r 1 + c) + p T * 2 (r 1 +c)+h 1 , since p T * 2 , h 1 ← r m q and r 1 +c ← r D m ,σ , then p T * 2 (r 1 + c) + h 1 is a Bi-GISIS sample. Hence, Game 2,3 , where k 1 is calculated by using p T * 2 , is computationally indistinguishable from Game 2,4 , where k 1 is selected from uniformly random samples, except for negligible probability.
2) THE OWNER OF TEST SESSION SID IS THE RESPONDER
Let the owner of sid * = (II, 2, B*, A*, x * 1 , x T * 2 ) be the responder.
a: TYPE ADV 3
In this type, the test session doesn't have a matching session. Therefore, wPFS is not provided for ADV 3 . Lemma 7 presents the security proof of ADV 3 .
Lemma 7: Let ADV be an adversary whose type is ADV 3 . The hardness assumption of the Bi-GISIS is satisfied with λ = O(n), √ nσ = β, q = O(2 λ mnβ 2 ), and k 1 −k 2 ≤ 16mnβ 2 + 2β. Then, the advantage of ADV is negligible in the ROM.
Proof: The proof of Lemma 7 is given with for all Game 3,i , where i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 5}. Game 3,0 :
. By using A, static public keys are honestly generated. · If ℘ = 0, then the output of S is shared with random secret key sk 1 ← r {0, 1} λ . · Otherwise, the output of S is sk 1 , which is the real session key of sid. The Analysis of Game 3,0 : The probability that S can cancel the execution in Game 3,0 is 1 tN 2 . Proof: In this game, S randomly chooses A*, B*, s T * 2 . By using the same idea given in the analysis of Game 1,0 , we conclude that the probability of cancelling the execution is calculated as 1 N · 1 N · 1 t . Game 3,1 : The oracles, which is described in Game 3,0 are impersonated by S, except for the start and the complete.
• When the complete (II, 1, A, B, x 1 , x T 2 ) is queried over S, k 1 = ← → x 2 T (s 2 +r 1 +c)+p T 2 (r 1 +c)+h 1 is computes by S, when the following conditions are completely satisfied. 1) A=A*.
2) The session is the s * 1 -th session of A*.
-Otherwise, S impersonates the oracle complete given in Game 3,0 . The Analysis of Game 3,1 : The probability of distinguishing the difference between Game 3,0 and Game 3,1 is negligible for all ADVs.
Proof: We use the same idea given in the analysis of Game 2,2 .
Game 3,2 : The oracles described in Game 3,1 is impersonated by S, except for the answer.
• When the answer (II, 2, B, A, x 1 ) is queried over S,
is computed by S, when the following conditions are completely satisfied. 1) B = A*.
2) The session is the s * 1 -th session of A*. -Otherwise, S impersonates the oracle answer given in Game 3,1 . The Analysis of Game 3,2 : The probability of distinguishing the difference between Game 3,1 and Game 3,2 is negligible for all ADVs.
Proof: We use the same idea given in the analysis of Game 2,1 . Game 3,3 : S impersonates the oracles given in Game 3,2 except for the query to replace the static secret key of A*, which is p * 1 , with the uniformly random sample, which is u 1 ← r m q . The Analysis of Game 3,3 : As long as the hardness assumption of the Bi-GISIS is satisfied, then the probability of distinguishing the difference between Game 3,2 and Game 3,3 is negligible for all ADVs.
Proof: As long as the hardness assumption of the Bi-GISIS is satisfied, p * 1 shouldn't be distinguished from u 1 ← r m q . In other words, there doesn't exist any polynomial time algorithm that distinguishes between Game 3,2 , where p * 1 is an example of the Bi-GISIS, and Game 3,3 , where p * 1 is uniformly random sample. Game 3,4 : The oracles described in Game 3,3 is impersonated by S, except for the answer.
• When the answer(II, 2, B, A, x 1 ) is queried over S, k 2 ← r m q is selected by S, when the following conditions are completely satisfied. 1) (A, B) = (A*, B*).
2) The session is the s T * 2 -th session of B*. 3) x 1 isn't generated by using the start(II, 1, A*, B*). -Otherwise, S impersonates the oracle answer given in Game 3,3 . The Analysis of Game 3,4 : As long as the hardness assumption of the Bi-GISIS is satisfied, then the probability of distinguishing the difference between Game 3,3 and Game 3,4 is negligible for all ADVs.
Proof: In the calculation of k 2 = (s T
Hence, Game 3,3 , where k 2 is calculated by using p * 1 , is computationally indistinguishable from the Game 3,4 , where k 2 is selected from uniformly random samples, except for negligible probability. Game 3,5 : S chooses w T 2 ← r m q and computes k 2 = w T 2 + (s T 1 + r T 2 + d T )( ← → x 1 ). As long as the hardness assumption of the Bi-GISIS is satisfied, then for all ADVs. the probability distinguishing Game 3,4 and Game 3,5 is negligible.
The Analysis of Game 3,5 : As long as w T 2 ← r m q , then k 2 be uniformly at random over m q . So, for all ADVs. the probability distinguishing the difference between Game 3,4 and Game 3,5 is negligible.
b: TYPE ADV 4
In this type to achieve wPFS by considering the fresh session definition (Definition 8), ADV should satisfy the following properties:
• ADV can obtain static secret key values of both parties by using the staticKR query.
• ADV can monitor the communication between the parties. Lemma 8 presents the security proof of ADV 4 .
Lemma 8: Let ADV be an adversary whose type is ADV 4 . The hardness assumption of the Bi-GISIS is satisfied with λ = O(n), √ nσ = β, q = O(2 λ mnβ 2 ), and k 1 −k 2 ≤ 16mnβ 2 + 2β. Then, the advantage of ADV is negligible in the ROM.
Proof: The proof of Lemma 8 is explained with for all Game 4,i , where i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 4}. Game 4,0 :
• S chooses A ← r m×m q . By using A, static public keys are honestly generated. · If ℘ = 0, then the output of S is shared with random secret key sk 1 ← r {0, 1} λ . · Otherwise, the output S is sk 1 , which is the real session key of sid.
The Analysis of Game 4,0 : The probability that S can cancel the execution in Game 4,0 is 1 t 2 N 2 . Proof: S randomly chooses A*, B*, s * 1 , s T * 2 as follows. By using the same idea given in the analysis of Game 1,0 , we conclude that the probability of cancelling the execution is computed as 1
Game 4,1 : The oracles described in Game 4,0 are impersonated by S, except for the complete. Proof: There is only one operation (sk 1 = sk 2 ) in Game 4,1 . Since Game 4,1 does not deal with the integrity, there is no difference between Game 4,0 and Game 4,1 in terms of parameters and queries.
Game 4,2 : The oracles described in Game 4,1 are impersonated by S, except for the start. 2) The session is the s * 1 -th session of A*. The Analysis of Game 4,2 : As long as the hardness assumption of the Bi-GISIS is satisfied, then the probability of distinguishing the difference between Game 4,1 and Game 4,2 is negligible for all ADVs.
Proof: We use the same idea given in the analysis of Game 1,2 .
Game 4,3 : The oracles described in Game 4,2 are impersonated by S, except for the complete.
• When the complete(II, 1, A, B, x 1 , x T 2 ) is queried over S, k 1 ← r m q is randomly selected by S, when the following conditions are completely satisfied. 1) (A, B) = (A*, B*).
2) The session is the s * 1 -th session of A. 3) x T * 2 isn't generated by the session of s T * 2 -th of B. The Analysis of Game 4,3 : As long as the hardness assumption of the Bi-GISIS is satisfied, then the probability of distinguishing the difference between Game 4,2 and Game 4,3 is negligible for all ADVs.
Proof: We use the same idea given in the analysis of Game 1,3 .
Game 4,4 : The oracles described in Game 4,3 are impersonated by S, except for the answer.
• When the answer(II, 2, A, B, x 1 ) is queried over S, x T 2 , k 2 ← r m q are randomly selected and x T 2 is sent to the other party by S,when the following conditions are completely satisfied. 1) (A, B) = (A*, B*).
2) The session is the s T * 2 -th session of B*. 3) x 1 is generated by the session of s * 1 -th of A*. -Otherwise, S impersonates the answer query given in Game 4,3 . The Analysis of Game 4,4 : As long as the hardness assumption of the Bi-GISIS is satisfied, then the probability of distinguishing the difference between Game 4,3 and Game 4,4 is negligible for all ADVs.
Proof: We use the same idea given in the analysis of Game 1,5 .
c: TYPE ADV 5
In this type, the test session doesn't have a matching session. Therefore, wPFS is not provided for ADV 5 . Lemma 9 presents the security proof of ADV 5 .
Lemma 9: Let ADV be an adversary whose type is ADV 5 . The hardness assumption of the Bi-GISIS is satisfied with λ = O(n), √ nσ = β, q = O(2 λ mnβ 2 ), and k 1 −k 2 ≤ 16mnβ 2 + 2β. Then, the advantage of ADV is negligible in the ROM.
Proof: The proof of Lemma 9 is explained with for all Game 5,i , where i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 3}.
Game 5,0 : · If ℘ = 0, then the output of S is random shared secret key sk 1 ← r {0, 1} λ . · Otherwise, the output of S is sk 1 , which is the real session key of sid. The Analysis of Game 5,0 : The probability that S can cancel the execution in Game 5,0 is 1 t 2 N 2 .
Proof: In this game, S randomly chooses A*, B*, s * 1 , s T * 2 . By using the same idea given in the analysis of Game 1,0 , we conclude that the probability of cancelling the execution is computed as 1 N · 1 N · 1 t · 1 t . Game 5,1 : The oracles described in Game 5,0 are impersonated by S, except for the complete.
• When the start (II, 1, A, B) is queried over S, x 1 ← r m q is selected instead of x 1 = Ar 1 + f 1 by S, when the following conditions are completely satisfied.
1) (A, B) = (A*, B*).
2) The session is the s * 1 -th session of A. -Otherwise, S impersonates the answer query given in Game 5,0 .
The Analysis of Game 5,1 : As long as the hardness assumption of the Bi-GISIS is satisfied, then the probability of distinguishing the difference between Game 5,1 and Game 5,0 is negligible for all ADVs.
Game 5,2 : The oracles described in Game 5,1 are impersonated by S, except for the answer. The Analysis of Game 5,2 : As long as the hardness assumption of the Bi-GISIS is satisfied, then the probability of distinguishing the difference between Game 5,1 and Game 5,2 is negligible for all ADVs.
Game 5,3 : The oracles described in Game 5,2 are impersonated by S, except for the answer.
• When the complete(II, 1, A, B, x 1 , x T 2 ) is queried over S, k 2 ← r m q is randomly selected and x T 2 is sent to the other party by S, when the following conditions are completely satisfied. 2) The session is the s T * 2 -th session of B* -Otherwise, S impersonates the complete query given in Game 1,2 .
The Analysis of Game 5,3 : As long as the hardness assumption of the Bi-GISIS is satisfied, then the probability of distinguishing the difference between Game 5,2 and Game 5,3 is negligible for all ADVs.
Proof: We use the same idea given in the analysis of Game 1,5 . 
IV. COMPARISON
In Table 1 , we compare the proposed scheme with the previous ones. This comparison summarizes the properties of the AKE schemes in terms of hardness assumption, security model, authentication concept, the number of required hash functions, the number of required core arithmetic operations such as multiplications and reusable key property.
The proposed AKE is a solution to the open problem defined in [4] . The security of the proposed scheme is based on the hardness of the Bi-GISIS problem. The reusable key property is added to the proposed AKE by using the bilateral pasteurization method. The comparison is presented by focusing the hardness assumption and reusable key property. The security of the proposed scheme depends on the hardness of the Bi-GISIS problem equivalent to the MLWE problem. By using the implicit authentication and ROM, it provides wPFS in the BR security model. As a result of the reusable key property, the number of matrix multiplications in the proposed scheme is higher than the others. There is a scheme with the reusable key property is given in [7] . Note that the hardness assumptions of these schemes are different and this causes different requirements.
Remark 3: Note that the scheme given in [9] and the proposed AKE cannot be fairly compared since their hardness assumptions are different. The number of matrix multiplications in the proposed scheme is higher than [9] since the reusable key property has a penalty: increasing the number of multiplications. With this property, the increased number of multiplications can be ignored since reusing the keys several executions gives much more benefits.
Remark 4: The main differences from [8] are the hardness assumption and the authentication property. Compared with [8] , the proposed scheme offers an authentication without any additional structure. The proposed scheme provides an alternative to quantum-resistant AKE schemes by including the reusable key property.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we construct a novel AKE scheme for the postquantum world which is a solution to the future work of [4] . To provide authentication, we add implicit authentication steps for the Bi-GISIS based KE scheme given in [4] . In addition, we use the bilateral pasteurization method to achieve reusable key property. With the help of this, the same shared secret key becomes available for the multiple executions of the proposed scheme. We explain the security in the ROM under the BR security model to achieve wPFS. As a future work, our aim is to determine the set of parameters for any security level and then give the computational complexity analysis for efficient implementations. In addition, password authenticated key exchange (PAKE) with reusable keys will be studied.
APPENDIX

BELLARE-ROGAWAY SECURITY MODEL
In [7] , BR security model [14] is adapted for two-pass authenticated key exchange scheme. In this version of BR model, an adversary can read, transform, insert and prevent messages over the network.
SESSION
A single execution of the scheme is called session. In the session, some parameters have special meanings.
• II: In the session of AKE, there are two parts. In the two-pass AKE scheme, a session consists of the following stages:
1. The owner of the session is A, which activates the session.
-The representation of the session is sid = (II, 1, A, B, M A , M B ). -The message form that activates the session is (II ,  1, A, B ). -The message M A is generated. In order to complete the session whose activation is realized by using the start query, the message M B is sent to A. 4. sessionKR(sid): If there is a session key of sid, then ADV returns this sid. 5. staticKR(A): The output of this oracle is A's static secret key. 6. test(sid): In the fresh session, this oracle is allowed to be used once to avoid some attacks. ℘ → r {0, 1} is chosen by ADV. Then, two cases occur.
-If ℘ = 1, then ADV returns the real session key of sid. -Otherwise, ADV returns the random session key.
